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It is argued that the concept of free will, like the concept of truth in formal languages, requires
a separation between an object level and a meta-level for being consistently defined. The Jamesian
two-stage model, which deconstructs free will into the causally open “free” stage with its closure
in the “will” stage, is implicitly a move in this direction. However, to avoid the dilemma of deter-
minism, free will additionally requires an infinite regress of causal meta-stages, making free choice
a hypertask. We use this model to define free will of the rationalist-compatibilist type. This is
shown to provide a natural three-way distinction between quantum indeterminism, freedom and
free will, applicable respectively to artificial intelligence (AI), animal agents and human agents.
We propose that the causal hierarchy in our model corresponds to a hierarchy of Turing uncom-
putability. Possible neurobiological and behavioral tests to demonstrate free will experimentally are
suggested. Ramifications of the model for physics, evolutionary biology, neuroscience, neuropatho-
logical medicine and moral philosophy are briefly outlined.
I. INTRODUCTION
Free will (FW) is a concept in philosophy that refers
to the putative capacity of a human agent to control her
behavior by choices made by an act of will, on basis of her
personal motives, convictions and intentions. The con-
cept rests on the belief that human behavior is not fully
determined by external causes. Moreover, her motives,
convictions and intentions are themselves not determined
by fully external causes, but self-determined. From a
common sense perspective, we feel we are free in mak-
ing decisions. Yet it continues to be debated, even after
centuries of argumentation, how to coherently define free
will and whether it exists in Nature [1].
FW can be regarded as freedom from some constraint:
exactly what that constraint is, has remained moot.
There are two broad philosophical positions on FW: In-
compatibilism, which holds that the relevant constraint
is determinism, and Compatibilism, which holds that de-
terminism is irrelevant to the definition of free will, and
that determinism and FW are compatible.
Two divergent Incompatibilist positions are Hard De-
terminism, which regards FW as false and determinism
as true, and (metaphysical) Libertarianism, which re-
gards determinism as false and FW as true. A FW Skep-
tic is an Incompatibilist who goes farther than a Hard
Determinist and denies that FW is even a coherent con-
cept. From the Skeptic perspective, indeterminism no
more allows an agent control and self-determination over
actions than does determinism. Since determinism and
indeterminism are the only two logically possible causal
primitives, this view holds that very concept of FW is
meaningless. This Skeptic stand is sometimes called the
dilemma of determinism or the standard modern argu-
ment against FW.
The libertarian may imagine that housed in her brain
∗Electronic address: srik@poornaprajna.org
is an immaterial agency (such as a soul or homunculus)
that somehow transcends the cause and effect law that
holds elsewhere in Nature. This is a logically tenable de-
fense of Libertarianism against Hard Determinism, even
if an adherent of the latter would deny the existence of
such immaterial agencies. But even the soul offers Lib-
ertarianism no protection against the Skeptic, because if
the soul’s choices transcend causality, they must be ran-
dom, or results of random properties, again making the
case for FW bleak!
The present work hopes to convince the FW Skeptic
that a coherent metaphysical account of FW is possible.
Of importance to our work is using an idea similar to
that used by Tarski to define the concept of truth, except
that here it is applied to causality. We think that FW is
a causal primitive different from both determinism and
indeterminism in being metatheoretic. Our attempt to
define it shows it to be a form of causation that straddles
endless levels of causality, provided we wish to form a
coherent scientific narrative that fits in with out intuitive
sense of self, freedom and responsibility.
This article is structured as follows. A version of
the Jamesian two-stage model is proposed in Section II,
which would be useful for our further discussion. Al-
though such a model has been considered as the defense
of FW against the dilemma of determinism, we point out
in Section III that the model fails, because the dilemma
can be recursively resurrected. In Section IV, we show
that an infinite recursion of Jamesian two-stage mod-
els restores a measure of protection for libertarianism
against the dilemma. This model is adapted to define
a Rationalist-Compatibilist FW. The connection of FW
to uncomputability [2] and Tarskian undefinability for
formal truth [3] are outlined in Section V. We then dis-
cuss the consequences of the model for neurobiology in
Section VI, before concluding in Section VII.
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2II. THE TWO-STAGE MODEL, 2S: A NEW
HOPE
The two-stage model [4], introduced in its original form
by W. James [5], and proposed in various forms by a
number of researchers, is intended to defeat the dilemma
of determinism. The model posits that FW is a two-
stage process: first there is freedom at the lower stage,
and then there is will at the higher stage, which makes
a choice. We present below a version of it, which we call
‘2S’, with several changes in the details, as described in
subsections II A and II B.
A. Physical stage L0 (Freedom)
At the moment an agent’s attention is drawn to a con-
flict situation, during a short time span, called the se-
lection window, in a localized region of brain, which we
refer to as the free-will oracle, probably in the pre-frontal
cortex, the physical laws W0 are put on a “causally open”
mode. In preparation of entry into this mode, alterna-
tive options x0, described by probability distribution P0,
are generated in the agent’s brain. The physical laws W0
only determine P0, but do not entirely fix the eventual
choice x0. And the selection is not completely deter-
mined by the past history of the physical universe. At
the close of the selection window, W0 in FW oracle is
re-set to the “causally closed” mode, and the choice x0
that is available on the FW oracle’s “register” at that
moment is expressed as the agent’s action.
If the agent makes the choice mechanically, without a
focused exertion of her will, then there is no mental cau-
sation influencing the choice (as described below), and at
the close of the selection window, a random x0 is selected
according to probability distribution P0.
B. Metaphysical stage L1 (Will)
If the agent decides to exert her will, then her choice
must not be random but instead reflect the desires, inten-
tions and beliefs characteristic of the agent. These prop-
erties constitute her cognitive private space, and may not
have a full representation in the physical level L0. Thus
the will produces generally a deviation from P0.
A simple way to describe this situation mathematically
is by:
x0 = λ1(P0), (1)
where λ1 is the “will function” that encodes the prop-
erties of her cognitive private space. Function λ1 takes
note of P0, but is not part of W0, because if it were, then
there would be causal closure in the physical, and hence
no freedom at L0. Instead, λ1 is determined by the laws
W1, which extend W0 to L1.
The fact that the causal openness at W0 is replaced by
causal closure of W1 in the consolidated system in L0+L1
suggests that these two levels can be ordered in a causal
hierarchy, which we represent by the expression: L1 ≺
L0. The ordering expresses that L1 causally precedes
L0.
C. 2S and the dilemma of determinism
In the absence of action by the will, the FW oracle can
be considered as a probabilistic input/output machine.
To underscore this, sometimes we will refer to such inde-
terministic behavior as freedom-without-will. We intro-
duce a level L 1
2
as essentially L0 equipped with a source
of pure randomness. Instances of freedom-without-will
have their causal closure in L0 + L 1
2
, but in this case
there is no deviation from P0. When the will is exerted,
the random variable X0 representing free choice deviates
from P0, and free will transcends physical causality.
The attempted defense of FW against the dilemma of
determinism using model 2S would be: FW is not deter-
ministic because of freedom at the physical stage. Nor is
it random because the eventual choice is self-determined,
being fixed by personal preferences via λ1.
Though not the definitive word on FW, the model 2S
brings the new insight that FW is a new causal primitive,
different from determinism and indeterminism. While
the latter two can be associated with a causally closed
lawfulness, and thus defined on a single causal level (say
L0), FW cannot. More of this below.
D. Free will in 2S and formal truth
As we indicated in Ref. [6], the 2S feature of introduc-
ing the metaphysical level to define FW on the physical
level parallels Tarski’s use [3] of a metalanguage in order
to consistently define the concept of arithmetic truth in
an object language. Tarski showed that without careful
separation of the two levels, one would end up with logi-
cal antinomies like the liar’s paradox “This statement is
false” (which is true iff it is false).
Similarly, if we fail to separate the “free” and “will”
stages in free choice, we will err in reducing the choice to
determinism or randomness. We believe that part of the
difficulty in understanding the nature of FW is due to a
lack of appreciation for this level separation.
With this in mind, we may consider L0 as the object
stage, and L1 as the metastage. The free-willed agent
with 2S structure will be designated F1. A deterministic
physical system, which is causally closed at level L0 is
designated F0, while an indeterministic quantum phys-
ical system, which has L0 freedom-without-will will be
denoted F 1
2
.
3III. DILEMMA OF DETERMINISM REVISITED
Although the model 2S resolves the dilemma of deter-
minism after a fashion, still the dilemma can be resur-
rected at level L1. To see this, note that the two-stage
agent F1, taken as a whole, is deterministic, in view of
Eq. (1), and must thus lack FW. This is just Schopen-
hauer’s argument, who picturesquely said, “Man can do
what he wants but he cannot will what he wants” [7], in
his prize-winning essay in response to the challenge posed
by the Royal Norwegian Academy of Sciences in 1839 [8].
To reinstate free will, we allow the will function λ1 to
be freely chosen, i.e., we apply 2S to the selection of λ1.
We extend the FW oracle from the physical level L0 to
the metaphysical L1. Within the selection window, the
laws W1 governing level L0 + L1 become momentarily
causally open in the region of the FW oracle. We thus
have freedom of the will at L1 whereby the L0 +L1 (i.e.,
physical-metaphysical) history of the universe does not
fix λ1.
We introduce a metalevel L2, where a higher-order will
function λ2 (“will free will”), provides causal closure, by
deterministically selecting a particular λ1. We can think
of λ2 as representing a deeper aspect of the agent’s char-
acter or disposition and as determining the type of the
will function λ1 that she will select. Function λ2 comes
from a further interior layer of the cognitive private space
of the agent. By adding an element of spontaneity and
self-determination, it thwarts the selection of λ1 from be-
ing modelled as an input/output process at level L1. In
the metatheoretic representation, this is tantamount to
treating F1 as the object system, and an L2-aspect as
the metasystem. A simple mathematical way to repre-
sent this is by:
λ1 = λ2(P1), (2)
where P1 is a probability function encoding L1-
preferences according to laws W1. If the higher-order
will λ2 is not exerted, then P1 would describe the inde-
terministic selection of will λ1. But if this “will free will”
is exerted, then there will be deviations from P1 in the
selection of λ1.
Substituting Eq. (2) into Eq. (1), we obtain:
x0 = λ1(P0) = [λ2(P1)](P0) ≡ λ∗2(P1, P0). (3)
The second-order will λ2 selects a first-order will λ1 de-
pending on P1, and then λ1 selects x0. The extended
causal hierarchy is L2 ≺ L1 ≺ L0, whereby L2 causally
precedes L1, which in turn precedes L0.
Here precedence refers not just to chronology but to
recursion depth in the agent’s cognitive private space.
It does not refer to an earlier event on the same causal
level, but to deeper or higher-order cause. For example,
if λ1 inclines Alice to give Bob a gift, then λ2 could be
her character trait of wanting to help him. A yet deeper
cause (λ3) would be wanting for good to him or people
she likes. And so on.
We denote by F2 the type of agent for who there is
causal closure at W2, and by F 3
2
one for who the will
function λ1 is selected indeterministically. Although the
existence of F2 resolves the dilemma of determinism on
L1, still the dilemma can be resurrected at level L2. This
is evident seeing that the action of λ∗2 in Eq. (3) is de-
terministic.
To reinstate free will at L2, we recursively apply 2S.
We make L2-law W2 at the FW oracle also causally open
within the selection window. Let the freedom of λ2 be
described by probability function P2, determined by W2.
Causal closure occurs at W3 via higher-order FW λ3 from
an even deeper aspect (L3-aspect) of the agent’s cognitive
private space. We have
λ2 = λ3(P2), (4)
Substituting Eq. (4) into Eq. (2), we obtain:
x0 = [λ2(P1)](P0) = [[λ3(P2)](P1)](P0)
≡ λ∗3(P2, P1, P0). (5)
We extend the causal hierarchy as L3 ≺ L2 ≺ L1 ≺ L0.
An agent with causal closure of her choosing process in
W3 is denoted F3 and one with freedom-without-will on
L2 (i.e., L2-indeterministic) is denoted F 5
2
.
Although the existence of F3 appears to resolve the
dilemma of determinism on stage L2, still the dilemma
can be resurrected at stage L3 since F3, in view of
Eq. (5), can be considered as a deterministic system.
This may be seen as a further higher-order extension of
Schopenhauer’s argument.
To prevent the dilemma of determinism at stage L3,
we introduce a 2S model on top of this stage, with F3 as
the object system, and L4 as the metastage. But then
the resultant F4 will be deterministic. We require L5 to
obtain a 2S model for F4 to avoid the dilemma of deter-
minism at level L4. Continuing this trend indefinitely, at
level Ln, where n is any positive integer, we have:
λn−1 = λn (Pn−1) . (6)
Substituting this recursively into lower levels into Eq.
(3), we obtain:
x0 = [[· · · [[λn (Pn−1)] (Pn−2)] · · · ](P1)](P0),
≡ λ∗n (Pn−1, · · · , P0) . (7)
Evidently, we can still resurrect the dilemma of deter-
minism at level Ln+1 no matter how large n is, since the
fact of λ∗n in Eq. (7) is a deterministic function. Thus,
the problem posed by this dilemma does not disappear
for agent Fn but is merely postponed.
In response to this seemingly insurmountable difficulty
posed by the recursive version of the dilemma of deter-
minism, the only option to save libertarianism seems to
be to let a free-willed agent be an infinite-stage entity,
F∞. What this means is that, for any finite integer n,
the laws (Wn) of cause and effect at the stage Ln will
4lack causal closure in the region of the extended FW ora-
cle during the selection window, and the selection of will
λn cannot be modelled as a probabilistic or determinis-
tic input/output system at stage. The causal closure for
Wn will come through a higher-order cause λn+1, which
is determined by the Ln+1-aspect of the cognitive private
space. Therefore, the agent’s choice of λn will transcend
nth-order causality Wn, so that the choice of λn should
be regarded as spontaneous and self-determined at that
stage.
In FW so understood, there is libertarian freedom in
the sense that the agent’s free choice has an inexhaustible
causal depth in her cognitive private space. Perhaps,
when we scan the inner space of our consciousness, and
feel that our choices are free, it is this infinitude that we
grasp intuitively, and feel inclined to report as genuine
personal freedom.
Identifying human agents with F∞ also means that FW
is at least a supertask [9], a process that involves a se-
quence of countably infinite number of steps executed in
finite time. In Section V, we will present an argument
suggesting that free choice is probably even a hypertask,
which involves uncountably many steps executed in finite
time.
IV. FREE WILL AS AN INFINITE
METATHEORETIC RECURSION
The free agent F∞ in our model is an infinite-stage
entity straddling the physical L0 and the “final” or
“infinite-th” stage, denoted L∞. For simplicity, we will
refer to the agents L0-aspect as the “physical aspect” and
the L∞-aspect as “transfinite aspect”. In a conflict situ-
ation, a response is initiated at the transfinite aspect and
transmitted to the physical aspect, where it manifests as
the choice x0. It stands to reason that the final desti-
nation to which information about the sensory input is
taken, before the agent’s response is initiated, must also
be the transfinite aspect.
A. An infinite, staged causation
Extending (7), we can represent the choice x0 through
a sequence of downward causations starting from the
“transfinite preference” P∞:
x0 = [[[· · · [[[λ∞(P∞)]] · · · ]](P2)](P1)](P0)
≡ λ#n [Pn, Pn−1, · · · , P∞](Pn−1, · · · , P0). (8)
The interpretation is that λ#n , the will at stage Ln, is
fixed by higher-order preferences, and then selects an out-
come x0 depending on lower-order preferences.
The form of Eq. (8) suggests that the larger the re-
cursion depth n, the fewer the higher-order preferences
Pn+1, Pn+2, · · · that could sway λ#n from the motivation
encoded by P∞. In Eq. (8), suppose that 0n−1, · · · , 00
represent the probability functions Pn−1, · · · , P0 that are
unbiased in the sense of being consistent with P∞.
Replacing the lower-order preferences by their unbi-
ased values in Eq. (8), we now define the nth-order intent
xn = λ
#
n [Pn, Pn+1, · · · , P∞] (0n−1, · · · , 00) , (9)
meaning that xn is the choice x0 that would be made
if there are no distortions downwards from level Ln−1.
Thus we may call x∞ as the “prime intent” or “transfinite
intent”, the option that would be selected if the will at
infinity, λ∞, were to act unthwarted on the physical.
During the act of free choice, the prime intent is re-
placed stage-wise by lower-order intents, until the final
choice is reached. We may refer to this infinite train
X ≡ x∞ → · · ·xn → xn−1 → · · · → x1 → x0, (10)
as the “descent of the will”. This immediately evokes the
notion of FW as the effectiveness of communication of x∞
from the transfinite aspect to the physical aspect, undis-
torted by lower-order preferences. The will is stronger,
if this channel of communication (“volition channel”) is
clearer, uncluttered by lower-order motivations, beliefs
and desires inconsistent with their transfinite counter-
parts. This line of thought forms the basis of the com-
patibilist FW introduced below.
B. Rationalist-compatibilist free will
The model above can be extended to protect FW from
what may be called the ‘rationalist/robot paradox’. By
definition, a free, rational agent will, when faced with a
choice, select the optimal option. His behavior is com-
pletely predictable, assuming that there is a single ratio-
nal option. For a libertarian, rationality appears to un-
dermine freedom [10]. Now this is not the case, as viewed
by a compatibilist. But the rationalist/robot paradox
asks how the compatibilist would differentiate a ratio-
nal agent from an optimal robot programmed to choose
rationally.
Following the line of thought indicated in Section IV A,
we would like to think of the correlation between the
prime intent and final choice as a measure of FW, since
it expresses how well the agent is able to hold on to her
prime intent by overcoming deviating influences. How-
ever, this correlation would stay as merely incidental,
unless the physical aspect holds x∞ as her purpose or
motive. For this, she must have cognizance of x∞. Pre-
cisely this defines the role played by the agent’s rational
faculty or reasoning in FW. We will refer to an F∞ agent
equipped with the rational faculty by F]∞.
The role played by reason is crucial. Without it, the
physical aspect has no motive to deviate behavior from
that determined by physical causality W0. Now there
may be random deviations from P0 (applicable to ani-
mal agents), but they would be devoid of any systematic
or deliberate attempt to transcend W0. By contrast, a
5human agent, on the recommendation of reason, tries
to overcome the imposition of W0 by trying to deviate
X0 towards X∞. Here the quantity Xj represents the
random variable corresponding to xj , i.e., values of vari-
ables associated with a probability distribution. Thus
the reasoning faculty serves as the basis through which
the opportunity provided by causal openness is exploited.
An agent is free to the extent that she is able to enforce
her transfinite will on her physical choice. (Complica-
tions arising from the corruption of the rational faculty
will be ignored here.) This gives us a quantification of
Rationalist-compatibilist FW:
f = Corr(X∞ : X0), (11)
where Corr is any measure normalized so that −1 ≤ f ≤
+1. The rational free-willed agent is characterized by f =
1, while a person completely under the sway of material
nature, by f = −1.
Lacking (substantial) reasoning, an animal may be rep-
resented simply by F∞. The animal is free, but not free-
willed. We express this insight with the expression:
Freedom + reason = free will (12)
Quantum matter, or in particular quantum AI, which
remains under the scope of physical causality, is a F 1
2
agent, while a classical robot is a F0 agent. It is clear
how this Rationalist-compatibilist account protects FW
from rationalist/robot paradox: a deterministic robot is
a F0 agent, while a rational free-willed agent is a F
]
∞
agent with f = 1.
The brain is arguably a special organ, whose physical
structure has somehow been evolved equipping it with a
FW oracle, providing a gateway to the transfinite aspect.
AI lacks this and the physical laws governing its dynamics
are causally closed.
It seems to be an interesting proposition that plants
and “lower animals” (like microbes), which lack a central
nervous system (CNS), could be considered as intermedi-
ary agents between quantum matter and higher animals
(like mammals, reptiles and birds, which have a CNS),
and thus represented by FK , where
1
2 < K < ∞. Some
of these ideas are summarized in Table I.
C. Causal vs Logical determinism
The resolution of the rationalist/robot paradox shows
that the predictability of behavior does not imply that
the behavior was causally determined (as in the robot’s
case). There is logical determinateness about the ratio-
nal agent’s behavior even though he transcends physical
causality. We express this idea by:
Logical determinism 6=⇒ Causal determinism. (13)
Entity Agent type Resource
Human F]∞ Free will (Freedom at
all orders, plus reason)
Higher Animals F∞ Freedom at all orders
(having a CNS)
Lower Animals FK Freedom up to
and plants ( 1
2
< K <∞) a finite order
(Lacking a CNS)
Quantum AI F 1
2
First-order
freedom-without-will
Classical AI F0 Determinism
TABLE I: Freedom gives spontaneity, reason gives self-
determination, and freedom with reason is free will. AI, lack-
ing a FW oracle and being thus just a special configuration
of quantum matter, is described by first-order indetermin-
ism. By contrast, the higher animal or human brain, being
equipped with a FW oracle, has freedom at all orders. Per-
haps the F∞ structure, common to humans and animals, is
necessary for emotional behavior.
Now this result would be undermined if all humans were
perfect (f = 1) then, even if P∞ 6= P0, we would be led to
suspect that there is a “law of goodness”, characterized
by P∞, that controls human behavior. However, some
people are imperfect (having f < 1), suggesting that hu-
man behavior in general transcends causal determinism,
and weakening the need to undermine the above conclu-
sion.
D. Experimental test
It is an interesting and old [8] question: how to exper-
imentally demonstrate the existence of FW? Our model
suggests that unfocussed or casual acts of choice would
be governed by a probability distribution P0, while a free-
willed action with deliberate intent will in general pro-
duce a deviation from P0 towards P∞.
The observation of discrepancy between the statistics
of focussed and unfocussed choice, could be one way to
demonstrate the existence of FW. Designing such an ex-
periment may not be easy, since the very act of focussing
may psychologically alter P0, so that an observed devia-
tion may either be due to will-induced deviation or due
to an alteration of P0 or due to both.
E. Why we are natural libertarians
The model also helps make sense of people’s instinctive
inclination to Libertarianism. It is a reasonable assump-
tion that as an agent introspectively scans the inner space
of her consciousness, depending on how subtle her aware-
ness is, she can at best objectively perceive only so deep
as there is freedom.
The unfreedom and higher-order causal influences ly-
ing beyond that point become part of her subjective con-
6sciousness, and she is unable to consciously experience
them, though she may deduce them by observing her
conscious choices and preferences.
V. FREE CHOICE AND UNCOMPUTABILITY
We now explain a line of thought indicated in Ref.
[6], on the correspondence between the causal hierarchy
and the hierarchy of Turing uncomputability, in reversed
ordering. That is, given a F]∞ agent, x∞ is computable,
while xm is harder to compute than xn if m < n.
The basic idea behind this claim is the following. Sup-
pose one has a computer program (or Turing machine)
so powerful that it can compute the free choice of a free-
willed agent, using the current most detailed description
of her brain state. Now if its prediction were shown to the
agent, being free-willed, she may contradict the predic-
tion. The conclusion is that such a powerful computer
program does not exist. We now consider a somewhat
more detailed argument.
Given a free-willed F]∞ agent A, suppose there is a
computer TC , programmable in some computer language
TL and suitable for the task of computing A’s free choice
x0. Let Aˆ denote the description of A as a computer
program in TL. We assume that all computer programs
that encode in TL the description of free-willed agents are
denumerable and that Aˆ is the ath program. Similarly,
one is assumed to be able to encode situation any conflict
situation J in the medium of TL by a description Jˆ , and
enumerate them alphabetically as some number j.
If free choice is computable, then the computer TC
can, given the enumerations for the TL-description of the
agent and the conflict situation, compute the agent’s free
choice in finite time, or:
TC(a; j) =
{
0⇐⇒ A(J) = 0
1⇐⇒ A(J) = 1, , (14)
where for simplicity we have assumed the outcome to
be two-valued. (There is no loss of generality, since any
computable output can be made binary, for example by
assigning “0” if the outcome is non-numerical or numer-
ical and less than 0, and “1” otherwise). In words, the
computer produces output 1 (resp., 0) if A freely chooses
1 (resp., 0) when faced with conflict situation J.
For any positive integer j, using this as a subroutine,
we can build another program:
TR(j) =
{
1⇐⇒ TC(j; j) = 0
0⇐⇒ TC(j; j) = 1, (15)
which is a representation of the above notion of the un-
cooperative free-willed agent. Thus TR outputs “0” on
input j iff the jth free-willed agent outputs “1” on the
jth conflict situation.
We can now apply the computer to TR, so that from
Eqs. (14) and (15):
TC(tR; j) =
{
1⇐⇒ TC(j; j) = 0
0⇐⇒ TC(j; j) = 1, (16)
where tR is the enumeration of TR. If we set j := tR,
then we are led to a contradiction as it would entail that
TC(tR, tR) = 0 iff TC(tR, tR) = 1.
To restore consistency, we infer that TC will never halt
on inputs (tR, tR), which thereby constitutes an unde-
cidable Go¨del sentence under the above encoding. We
conclude that in general x0 will be uncomputable for the
family of computer programs considered.
One can conceive a higher-level “meta-computer” pro-
gram T (1)C that is able to decide whether TR(tR) equals 0
or 1, but that is not contained in this family. If the cardi-
nality of such meta-computers is greater than ℵ0 (count-
able infinity), then the above diagonal argument based
paradox can be averted, because the meta-computers will
not be denumerable. This situation is similar to that per-
taining to the concept truth, of requiring a metalanguage
in order to define truth in the object language [3].
The proof given above for the uncomputability of x0 is
similar to the that of the uncomputability of the halting
problem for Turing machines [2]. The concept of a meta-
computer alluded to above indicates that the proof of
uncomputability “relativizes”, meaning that one can con-
struct harder problems, by allowing a computer program
to call as subroutine an “oracle” that solves the above free
choice problem in bounded time. One can then construct
a Go¨del sentence for this oracle-enhanced program, which
then yields a problem with its hardness shifted one level
higher than the free choice problem above. Problems
on the same level of uncomputability, i.e., uncomputable
problems which are Turing-equivalent, form a Turing de-
gree. The process can be repeated to construct higher
Turing degrees, i.e., the next higher levels of more un-
computable problem [? ]. It is known that there are 2ℵ0
(uncountably many) Turing degrees.
We suggest that the the causal hierarchy corresponds
to Turing degrees, but in inverse ordering, whereby the
prime intent, which arises beyond an infinite number of
causal stages, is itself Turing-computable. But the de-
scent of the will would correspond to transition to higher
levels of Turing uncomputability, making the free choice
of agents of sufficiently low FW highly uncomputable.
The act of FW in general must be a monstrous hyper-
task, since the lower causal stages correspond to ever
higher orders of uncomputability.
Why should the causal and computational hierarchy
correspond with each other? Here we will appeal to a
teleological argument: that if the consequences of the
causal hierarchy were computable, then there would have
been no need for the “brute force” computation provided
by the physical manifestation of the universe and human
agents!
Considerable research has been devoted in computabil-
ity theory and mathematical logic to the study of the
complicated structure of Turing degrees. Perhaps all of
that may have a bearing on the cognitive structure of
free-willed agents.
7VI. NEUROLOGICAL BASIS FOR FW
The presence of the FW oracle in the human brain
marks the basic difference between a human agent and
a robotic simulation. The question of how the FW ora-
cle is embedded in the brain and called forth, is briefly
considered here.
A F]∞ agent is an infinite entity, whereas the physical
brain of a human being is finite in terms of its information
storage and computation capacity. Therefore, if humans
are F]∞ agents, sufficiently high levels Lj cannot have a
physical representation, i.e., a neural correlate.
We propose the following physical realization of the
model. At the instance a human becomes aware of a
choice, she is instinctively driven to enact her “nature”,
encoded by P0. At the selection window, her “reason”,
which carries a representation of P∞, advices her to de-
viate X0 towards X∞. This creates a potential tension,
which may result in a fleeting quantum superposition,
and may correlate with the agent subjectively experienc-
ing an internal conflict.
Since P0 is determined by W0, its neural correlate is
expected to be well defined, and associated with the mo-
tor cortex. Since P∞ is largely computable, its neural
correlate is also expected to be well defined, and associ-
ated with the reasoning circuits in the pre-frontal cortex.
In Figure 1, these two correlates are represented as the
slow and fast neural pathways, at whose confluence the
FW oracle lies.
From physically observable data, one may be able to
predict a pattern of behavior. However, since the higher
levels in the causal hierarchy are not observable, there-
fore in any given instance of an agent’s free choice, even
the most detailed neural imaging (say via fMRI) will be
unable in principle to predict with full certainty what the
agent will select.
The FW mechanism in the brain of a F]∞ agent can
never be modelled as a finite input-output device. An im-
portant physical consequence is that, the mental causa-
tion that produces a deviation from W0 may correspond
to deviations from physical laws associated with W0, like
energy conservation or the Second Law of thermodynam-
ics. For example, the initial voltage fluctuation in a mo-
tor neuron that initiates the spontaneous movement of a
mouse’s whisker, may be energy-wise unaccounted physi-
cally, even though the subsequent nonlinear amplification
of that fluctuation to a physical action will certainly be
governed by (classical) physics.
A possible experimental test of the model could aim
to distinguish willful from casual choice. In the latter
case, the probability of choice will reflect P0, which can
be estimated from the relative strengths of signals, as
picked up by fMRI scans. Under willful choice, there will
be a deviation in the probability of choice away from P0
towards P∞.
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FIG. 1: Neurobiological flowchart for free choice by an agent.
The conflict situation triggers neural signals along two paths–
the fast “nature” path and the slow “reason” path– carrying
possibly opposing recommendations for action. If the neural
signal in the slow path is weak, the agent executes the in-
stinctive action induced by the fast path. But if the signal
in the slow path is sufficiently strong, and there is a conflict
between P0 and P∞, then a quantum superposition is set up
at the FW oracle, as the intermediate step for deviating X0
towards X∞.
VII. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We showed that, although metaphysical libertarianism
is provisionally protected against the dilemma of deter-
minism by the two-stage model, it is vulnerable to the
recursive version of the dilemma. As a defense for liber-
tarian freedom, we proposed the infinitely recursive two-
stage scheme. A free agent is described here by F∞, and
free-willed agents by F]∞. The concept of FW here is of
the Rationalist-compatibilist kind.
Some other issues, with ramifications for quantum
physics, neuroscience, mathematics, philosophy, compu-
tation theory, are briefly mentioned below.
There appears to be a parallelism between the will in
F1 and hidden variables in ontological models of quantum
mechanics [6]. But there are two basic differences: these
ontological models attempt explain probabilistic physical
laws W0 (and thus correspond to F 1
2
), whereas the will in
F1 may produce deviations from W0. Second, the will in
F1 is the first rung in an infinite hierarchy of higher-order
willings, whereas hidden variable models of quantum me-
chanics stop at unit depth.
Neurobiology is the area most affected by our model,
and also its possible clearest testing ground. Experimen-
tally locating the seat of the FW oracle in the brain, and
working out how mental causation initiates free-willed
action in motor neurons will be vital. Experiments that
distinguish willful and casual choice offer another window
of study the neurobiological circuitry for FW.
This understanding can be medically useful. By po-
8tentially clarifying the roles neurotransmitters or recep-
tors play in the process of free choice, it may be able
to suggest medical solutions that help encourage self-
controlled behavior, by enhancing the “reason” path-
way, rather than momentarily suppressing the “nature”
pathway (Figure 1). Such treatments may be useful for
patients suffering from neuropathological ailments like
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).
In mathematics and computation theory, the relation-
ship between the causal hierarchy and Turing degrees
would merit further study. This will help to elucidate
the scope of AI. The formalization of FW as presented
here, along the lines of formalization of the concept of
truth [3] would be the first step here.
Our model implies that high FW correlates with im-
proved predictability, i.e., reduced entropy in X0. This
reduction comes not by a compensatory increase in en-
tropy elsewhere in the universe as required by the Second
Law of thermodynamics, but by means of the deviation
from W0 produced by mental causation. Departure of Pj
from 0j is expressed as a conflict, and thus entropy, on
L0. A purely physical means to reduce entropy would be
subject to the Second Law, with no implications for the
agent’s cognitive freedom. But by freely reducing this
entropy, the agent is aligning her Pj ’s with 0j ’s, and en-
hancing her freedom. Thus concepts like moral respon-
sibility and justice are helpful as props that encourage
free-willed behavior, and thereby help reduce disorder,
though not necessarily on the physical level.
This in turn has implications for evolutionary biol-
ogy. It suggests that the underlying force driving evo-
lution was perhaps not Nature’s quest for propagating
the species most successful at survival, but instead Na-
ture’s quest for greater freedom. Darwin-like incremen-
tal evolution evolves quantum matter (F 1
2
agent) through
lower animals lacking a CNS (FJ with finite J), and then
through higher animals equipped with a CNS but no cere-
bral cortex (free agents, F∞), and from there, finally to
free-willed agents, F]∞. Thus Homo sapiens sapiens per-
haps already represents the limits of Darwinian biological
evolution. The remaining evolutionary journey, towards
greater freedom of the will, is now “up to us”. It should
be accomplished through self-determination.
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